Eighty years ago, Finland accepts the brutal truth of Soviet military superiority and Britain scores diplomatic points off Italy together with bonus points off Germany
The Finnish delegation led by
prime minister Risto Ryti arrived in Moscow to negotiate with the Soviets. The
battle had firmly turned against the Finns and the town of Vipuri was about to
be cut off. They had little alternative to accept harsh Soviet terms, which
exceeded by some measure what Stalin had demanded before the war. Karelia was
ceded to the USSR which cost 12% of the Finnish population its homes. The new land
border was – intentionally – indefensible.
Finland lost 80% of its high quality wood pulp capacity and a third of its
hydroelectric generation, which was diverted to supply Leningrad. The Finns granted the USSR the right of
transit for troops to Norway. Finland had escaped the full conquest,
enslavement and wholesale murder inflicted on Poland by Stalin but this was
mild consolation. The British government could indulge in enthusiastic public
hand-wringing over the treaty but was spared the embarrassment of making good
on its vague promises of military assistance to the Finns, which would probably
have ended in a debacle comparable to every major British operation (except the
Libyan campaign) for the next two years. It is an open question whether
intervention would have pushed the USSR towards
a full alliance with Nazi Germany.
Britain could enjoy a happier outcome to its sudden surge of
diplomatic resolve towards Italy; it also inflicted a brief but painful
humiliation of Germany. Confronted by the detention of a dozen ships carrying
vitally needed coal from Germany, Count Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, showed
himself unusually willing to discuss the matter in a straightforward manner
with the British ambassador. This coincided with a visit by Joachim von
Ribbentrop to Rome who was thus confronted by a conspicuous erosion of German influence
with Mussolini. The Italians speedily agreed to discontinue seaborne imports of
coal from Germany in a significant – but as it proved very brief – concession to
Britain. This helped inspire Chamberlain to try to resuscitate the secret
channel to Mussolini, which had been so active in the first months of his
premiership when appeasement had been the order of the day, as a conduit to
Berlin and a negotiated end to the war. (The full, hitherto almost unknown story
is in my Fighting Churchill, Appeasing Hitler).
Never has the saying that revenge
is a dish best eaten cold been more appropriate than when the Sikh Udham Singh
finally caught up with the former Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, Sir Michael O’Dwyer
at a joint meeting of the East India Association and the Royal Society for Asian
Affairs at the Caxton Hall in Westminster presided over by the Lord Zetland,
the Secretary for India. O’Dwyer bore much of the responsibility for the Amritsar
massacre in 1919 when British troops had killed hundred of unarmed protesters.
O’Dwyer had successfully defended his conduct in a libel action and, whilst he
rose no further in the Indian Civil Service, had never suffered any penalty for
his actions. Udham Singh shot O’Dwyer dead and wounded Zetland.
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