The Duke and Duchess of Windsor flirt indiscreetly with Nazi sympathizers in Spain and Portugal
The latest release of documents
from the National Archives hugely fleshes out the record of the Duke of Windsor’s
time in Spain and Portugal after fleeing France in 1940. The main lines of the
story were already known but it appears that far from all of the telegrams from
the German missions to Spain and Portugal had previously seen the light of day.
Churchill’s argument for
suppressing the telegrams is valid insofar as they come purely from the German
side and describe a Nazi intrigue to entrap him and they depend on the “assertions
of German and pro-German officials”. Certainly, the documents must be read with
the caveat that they give only an indirect picture of the Duke. However, unless
the documents are entirely false, the “impression that the Duke was in close
touch with German Agents and was listening to suggestions that were disloyal”
is accurate. At best the Duke was wildly indiscreet, at worst treasonous. It
would have required enormous naïveté on his part to be unaware of the risk (to
put it at its gentlest) that his Spanish and Portuguese interlocutors would
pass what he said on to the Germans.
Of course, the value of Duke in
his varying incarnations as a potential
tool of German policy was very much a hobby-horse of von Ribbentrop and, to an
extent, Hitler’s. The enthusiasm with which was still being pursued in 1940 by
the German ministry of foreign affairs is nonetheless striking. The Duke’s repeated
claims that the war would never have occurred had he remained King are evidence
that German faith in him was exaggerated but not a complete fantasy.
To his credit the Duke believed
that his abdication was final and was surprised at the thought of the Germans
placing him back on the throne. The Duchess, though, seems to have been open to
the idea the idea that the “course of the war” (presumably German conquest of Britain)
might change the constitution in their favour. The Germans were prepared to fulfil
the couple’s every wish. Ribbentrop described the “tendency of those wishes” as
“obvious” although it is an open question whether he meant restoration to the
throne or the Duke’s wishes that he set out to the Spanish minister for foreign
affairs: for the Duchess to be recognised as a member of the Royal Family and for
the Duke to be given an “influential” civil or military post.
The most damaging indiscretion
reported by the Duke is the repeated idea that he might serve as an intermediary
between Germany and the British government to bring about peace and that he foresaw
himself returning to Europe from the Bahamas to perform this task. He explained
his reluctance to take on the role immediately by tactical timing
considerations but the telegram he sent asking to be told when “action was
necessary” suggests
The Duke’s lack of discretion
(and taste) beggars belief. He compromised himself appallingly by disclosing
that he was leaving for the Bahamas under threat of court-martial. It is hard
to see what he imagined this would bring him beyond demonstrating that he saw
himself as a free agent. He openly described his brother George VI as “altogether
stupid” and accused Queen Elizabeth of intriguing against him and in particular
the Duchess. How far he genuinely distanced himself from the “Churchill clique”
but these documents only add support to the image of the Duke as defeatist and “fifth
column” (in the words of David Eccles the British agent particularly tasked
with keeping an eye on him).
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